The Maximin Support Method: An Extension of the D'Hondt Method to Approval-Based Multiwinner Elections

2016/09/17 by Luis Sánchez-Fernández, Sánchez-Fernández, Luis, Norberto Fernández +6
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems #I.2.11 #Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting #cs.GT

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1609.05370

openalex publication_date 2016/09/17 · arxiv created 2018/09/05 · arxiv updated 2018/09/07 · openalex created_date 2022/10/01 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We propose the maximin support method, a novel extension of the D'Hondt apportionment method to approval-based multiwinner elections. The maximin support method is based on maximizing the support of the least supported elected candidate. It can be computed efficiently and satisfies (adjusted versions of) the main properties of the original D'Hondt method: house monotonicity, population monotonicity, and proportional representation. We also establish a close relationship between the maximin support method and Phragmén's voting rules.

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