Generalizations of Divisor Methods to Approval and Score Voting

2017/01/10 by Martin Djukanović, Djukanović, Martin
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #91B12 #91B14 #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems #cs.GT #msc:91B12 #msc:91B14

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1701.02396

22 pages, 1 figure; changed step 2) in Algorithms 4,8,10 and Thiele (Ex. 5.1) to better suit our aims; new examples and some new notations

openalex publication_date 2017/01/10 · arxiv created 2017/01/23 · arxiv updated 2017/01/24 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We introduce several electoral systems for multi-winner elections with approval ballots, generalizing the classical methods of Sainte-Laguë and D'Hondt. Our approach is based on the works of Phragmén and Thiele. In the last section we discuss possible generalizations to score voting.

Related

• Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences
• Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting
• Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods
• Algorithms for two variants of Satisfaction Approval Voting
• Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules