2018/09/12 by Doron Klunover, John Morgan, Klunover, Doron +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) #econ.TH
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1809.04436
openalex publication_date 2018/09/12 · arxiv created 2020/09/13 · arxiv updated 2020/09/15 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that all equilibria are near the unconstrained equilibrium. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case when players have different prize evaluations.