2023/10/04 by Benjamin Heymann, Alejandro Jofré, Heymann, Benjamin +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic Policies and Impacts #Economic theories and models #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2310.02898
openalex publication_date 2023/10/04 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We introduce a class of Bayesian bidding games for which we prove that the set of pure Nash equilibria is a (non-empty) sublattice and we give a sufficient condition for uniqueness that is often verified in the context of markets with inelastic demand. We propose a dynamic that converges to the extrema of the equilibrium set and derive a scheme to compute the extreme Nash equilibria.