2026/07/04 by Koichi Osamura · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Bureaucracy #Cabinet (room) #Chamber of Deputies #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Function (biology) #Legislature #Policy Transfer and Learning #Politics #Politics and Society in Latin America #Presidential system
paper · doi:10.1177/13540688261466129
published in Party Politics (SAGE Publishing)
openalex publication_date 2026/07/04 · openalex created_date 2026/07/05 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/05
How does the provision of political appointments influence coalition support in multiparty presidential systems? While the importance of cabinet portfolios for coalition governments is well-established, lower-tier positions have received less attention being limited to compensations for weak policy-making capabilities. In multiparty presidential systems, however, these appointments also function as bargaining chips during coalition formation. I argue that bureaucratic appointments help sustain coalition support, especially during votes on bills issued by the executive power. Analyzing roll-call data from Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies (2003–2018) across 161 bills, I find that besides ministerial portfolios, lower-tier appointments strongly increase legislative support, highlighting the strategic use of patronage under high political stakes. These findings contribute to understanding coalition management strategies in fragmented presidential systems.