1995/09/01 by Arthur Lupia, Kaare W. Strøm · 1 voice · 419 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Cabinet (room) #Democracy #Dismissal #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth #Law #Law and economics #Legislature #Lower house #Multi-party system #Parliament #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Public administration
paper · doi:10.2307/2082980
published in American Political Science Review 89(3), 648-665 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 1995/09/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/16
Cabinet coalitions in multiparty parliamentary democracies lead a precarious existence. Legislative majorities can typically dismiss the cabinet at will and can sometimes force early elections through parliamentary dissolution. Since coalition termination can have substantial political consequences, it is important to understand when and why such decisions are made. To this end, we develop a model of coalition bargaining in a legislature with dismissal and dissolution powers. We use the model to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for both coalition termination and parliamentary dissolution. In contrast to several widely held maxims, we find that coalition terminations need not be the automatic consequence of exogenous shocks. Nor do opportunistic parties with favorable electoral prospects always dissolve parliament to enhance their power. Instead, decisions to terminate coalitions or call new elections result from party leaders' rational responses to the constraints of legislative and electoral institutions and the anticipated feelings of the electorate.