1996/05/01 by Vincent H. Smith, Barry K. Goodwin · 8 citations
Agricultural and Biological Sciences · Health Professions · Social Sciences · #Actuarial science #Agricultural economics #Agricultural risk and resilience #Agricultural science #Agriculture #Business #Crop insurance #Economics #Environmental science #Food Security and Health in Diverse Populations #Geography #Hazard #Incentive #Income, Poverty, and Inequality #Insurance policy #Key person insurance #Microeconomics #Moral hazard #Morale hazard #Risk pool
paper · doi:10.2307/1243714
openalex publication_date 1996/05/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Abstract This study examines the relationship between chemical input use and crop insurance purchase decisions for a sample of Kansas dryland wheat farmers. Recent research by Horowitz and Lichtenberg indicated that, contrary to conventional wisdom, farmers that purchased insurance tended to use relatively more chemical inputs than farmers who did not insure. In contrast, our results confirm the conventional view that moral hazard incentives lead insured farmers to use fewer chemical inputs. Implications for the joint determination of insurance and input use decisions and appropriate estimation techniques are discussed.