School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation

2013/01/28 by Parag A Pathak, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez · 324 citations
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Engineering · Mathematics · #Computer science #Computer security #Economics #Engineering #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting #Legal and Constitutional Studies #Mathematics #Mechanism (biology) #Midstream #Political science #Public administration #Rank (graph theory) #Sociology #Vulnerability (computing)

paper · doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.80

published in American Economic Review 103(1), 80-106 (American Economic Association)

openalex publication_date 2013/01/28 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/11

Abstract

In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Our methodology formalizes how the old mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism, including the new one. A number of similar transitions took place in England after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes. (JEL C78, D82, H75, I21, I28)

Citations

• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

Cited by

• Manipulability in school choice
• Obvious manipulations
• School Choice and Educational Mobility
• Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management
• The Impact of Public School Choice: Evidence from Los Angeles’s Zones of Choice
• Hybrid Mechanisms: Trading off Strategyproofness and Efficiency of Random Assignment Mechanisms
• Choix d'écoles en France
• The Local Refugee Match: Aligning Refugees’ Preferences with the Capacities and Priorities of Localities
• Two-Sided Matching for mentor-mentee allocations-Algorithms and manipulation strategies. [europepmc]

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