Dilemma game in a traffic model with the crossing

2010/06/06 by Wei Zhang, Zhang, Wei
Earth and Planetary Sciences · Engineering · Physics and Astronomy · #Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems (nlin.AO) #Aquatic and Environmental Studies #Cellular Automata and Lattice Gases (nlin.CG) #Evacuation and Crowd Dynamics #FOS: Physical sciences #Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) #Traffic control and management #nlin.AO #nlin.CG #physics.soc-ph

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1006.1079

8 figures

arxiv created 2010/06/06 · openalex publication_date 2010/06/06 · arxiv updated 2010/06/08 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the non-signalized intersection issue considering traffic flow and energy dissipation in terms of game theory based on the Nagel-Schreckenberg (NaSch) model. There are two types of driver agents at the intersection when vehicles on the two streets are approaching to it simultaneously: C agents (cooperative strategy) pulling up to avoid collision and D agents (defective strategy) crossing the intersection audaciously. Phase diagram of the system, which describes free-flow phase, segregation phase, jammed phase and maximum current curve representing the social maximum payoff, is presented. Dilemma game is observed at the phase-segregated state except for the case of v_max =1.

Related

• Game Theoretic Application to Intersection Management: A Literature Review
• Vehicular traffic flow at a intersection controlled by signal light with a new probability
• Cooperative game in a two-lane traffic flow
• Human-like Driving Decision at Unsignalized Intersections Based on Game Theory
• Game-Theoretic Modeling of Multi-Vehicle Interactions at Uncontrolled Intersections