2020/05/27 by Mingjian Tuo, Tuo, Mingjian, Arun Venkatesh Ramesh +3
Computer Science · Engineering · Mathematics · #FOS: Electrical engineering #FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Power System Optimization and Stability #Smart Grid Energy Management #Smart Grid Security and Resilience #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #cs.SY #eess.SY #electronic engineering #information engineering #math.OC
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2005.13207
6 pages, 9 figures
arxiv created 2020/05/27 · openalex publication_date 2020/05/27 · arxiv updated 2020/05/28 · openalex created_date 2020/06/05 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
With improvement in smart grids through two-way communication, demand response (DR) has gained significant attention due to the inherent flexibility provided by shifting non-critical loads from peak periods to off-peak periods, which can greatly improve grid reliability and reduce cost of energy. Operators utilize DR to enhance operational flexibility and alleviate network congestion. However, the intelligent two-way communication is susceptible to cyber-attacks. This paper studies the benefits of DR in security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) and then the vulnerability of the system to line overloads when cyber-attack targets DR signals. This paper proposes a false demand response signal and load measurement injection (FSMI) cyber-attack model that sends erroneous DR signals while hacking measurements to make the attack undetectable. Simulation results on the IEEE 24-bus system (i) demonstrate the cost-saving benefits of demand response, and (ii) show significant line overloads when the demand response signals are altered under an FSMI attack.