2020/03/14 by Zhigang Chu, Jiazi Zhang, Chu, Zhigang +5
Computer Science · Engineering · #Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis #Power System Reliability and Maintenance #Smart Grid Security and Resilience #cs.SY #eess.SY
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2003.07699
8 pages, 6 figures. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1903.07781
arxiv created 2020/03/14 · arxiv updated 2020/03/18
This paper demonstrates that false data injection (FDI) attacks are extremely limited in their ability to cause physical consequences on N-1 reliable power systems operating with real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). Prior work has shown that FDI attacks can be designed via an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) to cause physical overflows after re-dispatch using DCOPF. In this paper, it is shown that attacks designed using DCOPF fail to cause overflows on N-1 reliable systems because the system response modeled is inaccurate. An ADBLP that accurately models the system response is proposed to find the worst-case physical consequences, thereby modeling a strong attacker with system level knowledge. Simulation results on the synthetic Texas system with 2000 buses show that even with the new enhanced attacks, for systems operated conservatively due to N-1 constraints, the designed attacks only lead to post-contingency overflows. Moreover, the attacker must control a large portion of measurements and physically create a contingency in the system to cause consequences. Therefore, it is conceivable but requires an extremely sophisticated attacker to cause physical consequences on N-1 reliable power systems operated with RTCA and SCED.