2008/01/30 by S. Schneider, Susan C. Schneider · 91 citations
Engineering · Health Professions · Psychology · Social Sciences · #Blame #Computer science #Disaster Management and Resilience #Disaster Response and Management #Disaster response #Emergency management #Emergency response #Engineering #Function (biology) #Geography #Government (linguistics) #Hurricane katrina #Law #Natural disaster #Perception #Political science #Process (computing) #Psychology #Public administration #Public relations #Risk Perception and Management #Social psychology #Work (physics)
paper · doi:10.1093/publius/pjn019
published in Publius The Journal of Federalism 38(4), 715-738 (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 2008/01/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
This analysis shows that the intergovernmental response to Hurricane Katrina collapsed because those involved in the process did not have a clear understanding of their own roles and responsibilities or how the entire governmental response system should operate. New data are presented which demonstrate that citizens’ attitudes about intergovernmental responsibilities coincide quite closely with how the disaster response system is designed to function, but they differ from the way public officials involved in the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts thought the process should work. This mismatch between what various levels of government are expected to do and what activities they actually perform in emergency situations has contributed to extremely negative impressions within the American public about governmental performance during natural disasters.