Justified Fairness in House Allocation Problems: two Characterizations of Strategy-proof Mechanisms

2024/07/19 by Feng Di, Jacob Coreno, Feng, Di +1
Social Sciences · #FOS: Economics and business #Legal principles and applications #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.14101

openalex publication_date 2024/07/19 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01

Abstract

We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties (strategy-proofness and non-bossiness), our two new properties identify serial dictatorships and sequential dictatorships, respectively.

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