2010/03/11 by Ran Tao, Fubing Su, Mingxing Liu +2 · 6 citations
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance #Local Government Finance and Decentralization #Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
paper · doi:10.1177/0042098009357961
By analysing the evolution of local governments’ roles in different periods of China’s growth in transition, this paper explores local fiscal incentives to use subsidised land and infrastructure as key instruments in regional competition for manufacturing investment since the mid 1990s. Local land development behaviour is related to China’s current land use institutions and intergovernmental arrangements. On the basis of panel data covering prefectural-level cities from 1999 to 2003, the paper empirically identifies and compares the fiscal impacts of different forms of land leasing (by negotiation versus by auction/tender). Policy implications are drawn from this analysis, for the further reform of China’s urban land system and fiscal institutions.