2021/05/26 by Caspar Jacobs · 11 citations
Arts and Humanities · Mathematics · Physics and Astronomy · #Epistemology #Equivalence (formal languages) #Homogeneous space #Law #Mathematics #Mistake #Origins and Evolution of Life #Philosophy #Philosophy and History of Science #Philosophy of science #Physics #Pure mathematics #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Symmetry (geometry) #Theoretical physics
paper · pdf · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03205-5
published in Synthese 199(3-4), 9337-9357 (Springer Science+Business Media)
openalex publication_date 2021/05/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31
Abstract The presence of symmetries in physical theories implies a pernicious form of underdetermination. In order to avoid this theoretical vice, philosophers often espouse a principle called Leibniz Equivalence , which states that symmetry-related models represent the same state of affairs. Moreover, philosophers have claimed that the existence of non-trivial symmetries motivates us to accept the Invariance Principle , which states that quantities that vary under a theory’s symmetries aren’t physically real. Leibniz Equivalence and the Invariance Principle are often seen as part of the same package. I argue that this is a mistake: Leibniz Equivalence and the Invariance Principle are orthogonal to each other. This means that it is possible to hold that symmetry-related models represent the same state of affairs whilst having a realist attitude towards variant quantities. Various arguments have been presented in favour of the Invariance Principle: a rejection of the Invariance Principle is inter alia supposed to cause indeterminism, undetectability or failure of reference. I respond that these arguments at best support Leibniz Equivalence.