2024/07/14 by Fernando Genis Mendoza, Mendoza, Fernando Genis, Pablo R. Baldivieso‐Monasterios +5
Engineering · #Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure #FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Smart Grid Energy Management
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.10144
openalex publication_date 2024/07/14 · openalex created_date 2024/07/17 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
An existing challenge in power systems is the implementation of optimal demand management through dynamic pricing. This paper encompasses the design, analysis and implementation of a novel on-line pricing scheme based on coalitional game theory. The setting consists of a network with multiple energy retailers competing to attract consumers by announcing a price in a hierarchical leader-follower structure. The process of coalition formation under such a pricing scheme can be viewed as a game for which we show that a Stackelberg equilibrium exists, \ie given a price, consumers will respond by conforming to a reciprocal power consumption quantity. We propose a coalition formation algorithm and perform a game-theoretic stability analysis on the resulting coalitions. We integrate the pricing setting with a resistive micro-grid dynamic model. In this context we analyse the behaviour of the integrated system, bridging the gap between market and physical layers of the problem. Simulations provide a comparison of profits generated by the proposed scheme against a more traditional single retailer scheme, while simultaneously showing convergence towards a steady-state equilibrium. Additionally, we shed light into the system's physical response when subject to our proposed pricing scheme.