How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits
2025/05/21 by Craig Gidney, Gidney, Craig · 14 voices · 68 citations
Computer Science · #Coding theory and cryptography #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.15917
Abstract
Planning the transition to quantum-safe cryptosystems requires understanding the cost of quantum attacks on vulnerable cryptosystems. In Gidney+Ekerå 2019, I co-published an estimate stating that 2048 bit RSA integers could be factored in eight hours by a quantum computer with 20 million noisy qubits. In this paper, I substantially reduce the number of qubits required. I estimate that a 2048 bit RSA integer could be factored in less than a week by a quantum computer with less than a million noisy qubits. I make the same assumptions as in 2019: a square grid of qubits with nearest neighbor connections, a uniform gate error rate of 0.1%, a surface code cycle time of 1 microsecond, and a control system reaction time of 10 microseconds. The qubit count reduction comes mainly from using approximate residue arithmetic (Chevignard+Fouque+Schrottenloher 2024), from storing idle logical qubits with yoked surface codes (Gidney+Newman+Brooks+Jones 2023), and from allocating less space to magic state distillation by using magic state cultivation (Gidney+Shutty+Jones 2024). The longer runtime is mainly due to performing more Toffoli gates and using fewer magic state factories compared to Gidney+Ekerå 2019. That said, I reduce the Toffoli count by over 100x compared to Chevignard+Fouque+Schrottenloher 2024.
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Discussions
- arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917 [bsky, 23 points, 1 comments]
- It's time we rename Q-Day to Gidney-Day. arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917 [bsky, 18 points, 0 comments]
- Major update on factoring primes with Shor’s algorithm from Craig Gidney at #Google. - reduced physical #qubit count from 20e6 to 1e6 to break a RSA-2048 bit key, using yoked surface codes, magic stat [bsky, 11 points, 0 comments]
- Factoring RSA 2048 bit keys in <1M qubits from Google... Providing there are no errors, this takes the required factoring estimate down to ~2^19 qubits. We were at 2^10 in Dec 2023, so assuming it dou [bsky, 10 points, 2 comments]
- This astonishing result shows that it can be done with far fewer qubits than imagined before. This is the start of a critical journey—you need to be worried 👉🏼 arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917 [bsky, 6 points, 0 comments]
- Major update on factoring primes with Shor’s algorithm from Craig Gidney at #Google. - reduced physical #qubit count from 20e6 to 1e6 to break a RSA-2048 bit key, using yoked surface codes, magic stat [bsky, 5 points, 0 comments]
- How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits [hn, 3 points, 0 comments]
- Google researcher Craig Gidney's new findings: breaking RSA encryption now requires 20x fewer quantum resources than previously estimated. This affects everything: Bitcoin, TLS, PKI infrastructure. Th [bsky, 2 points, 0 comments]
- Bad news for bitcoin arxiv.org/pdf/2505.15917 [bsky, 2 points, 0 comments]
- To break 2048-bit RSA with Shor or Regev algorithm you would need so-called fault tolerant quantum computer . Such computer would be able to carry out several billions of quantum operations on hundred [stackexchange, 2 points]
- Kidney's full article, "How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits" is here: arxiv.org/pdf/2505.15917 We'll be updating and linking it on quantum doom clock shortly! [bsky, 0 points, 0 comments]
- Craig Gidney's work tackles that question: arxiv.org/abs/2505.159.... Check out the figures in the appendix: the physical qubits are used quite densely! [bsky, 0 points, 0 comments]
- Craig Gidney published a new paper, “How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits.” This is a 20-times reduction from the estimate the same author made six years ago. www. [bsky, 0 points, 0 comments]
- arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917 [bsky, 0 points, 0 comments]
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