2012/06/20 by Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Daniel M. Reeves, Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy +4
Decision Sciences · Computer Science · #Auction Theory and Applications #Artificial Intelligence in Games
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1206.5288
We present a functional framework for automated mechanism design based on a\ntwo-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the\nmechanism participants, and apply it to several classes of two-player infinite\ngames of incomplete information. At the core of our framework is a black-box\noptimization algorithm which guides the selection process of candidate\nmechanisms. Our approach yields optimal or nearly optimal mechanisms in several\napplication domains using various objective functions. By comparing our results\nwith known optimal mechanisms, and in some cases improving on the best known\nmechanisms, we provide evidence that ours is a promising approach to parametric\ndesign of indirect mechanisms.\n