2003/05/15 by Arne Soulier, Soulier, Arne, Tim Halpin-Healy +1
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Evolution and Genetic Dynamics #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #cond-mat.stat-mech
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.cond-mat/0305356
4 Pages; 5 Figures; PRL format; for additional info, and a Seceder applet, see http://urania.barnard.edu/~mass/index.html
arxiv created 2003/05/15 · arxiv updated 2009/11/30
We examine kinetic symmetry breaking phenomena in an evolutionary political game in which voters, inhabiting a multidimensional ideological space, cast ballots via selection mechanisms subject to the competing forces of conformity and dissent. Our understanding of the spatiotemporally complex population dynamics is informed by a system of nonlinear replicator equations, discrete deterministic cousin of the original stochastic Seceder Model.