2018/02/22 by Jamie Tucker-Foltz, Tucker-Foltz, Jamie
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth #Game Theory and Voting Systems
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1802.08351
openalex publication_date 2018/02/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
This paper presents a novel mechanism to endogenously determine the fair division of a state into electoral districts in a two-party setting. No geometric constraints are imposed on voter distributions or district shapes; instead, it is assumed that any partition of the population into districts of equal population is feasible. One party divides the map, then the other party chooses a minimum threshold level of support needed to win a district. Districts in which neither party meets this threshold are awarded randomly. Despite the inherent asymmetry, the equilibria of this mechanism always yield fair outcomes, up to integer rounding.