2014/07/22 by Ali Khanafer, Tamer Başar, Khanafer, Ali +1
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Medicine · Physics and Astronomy · #91A43 #Distributed Control Multi-Agent Systems #FOS: Electrical engineering #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Applications #Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1407.6075
openalex publication_date 2014/07/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We study the interaction between a network designer and an adversary over a\ndynamical network. The network consists of nodes performing continuous-time\ndistributed averaging. The adversary strategically disconnects a set of links\nto prevent the nodes from reaching consensus. Meanwhile, the network designer\nassists the nodes in reaching consensus by changing the weights of a limited\nnumber of links in the network. We formulate two Stackelberg games to describe\nthis competition where the order in which the players act is reversed in the\ntwo problems. Although the canonical equations provided by the Pontryagin's\nmaximum principle seem to be intractable, we provide an alternative\ncharacterization for the optimal strategies that makes connection to potential\ntheory. Finally, we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a\nsaddle-point equilibrium for the underlying zero-sum game.\n