Institutions and cooperation: A meta-analysis of structural features in social dilemmas.

2024/10/24 by Shuxian Jin, Giuliana Spadaro, Daniel Balliet · 1 voice · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

paper · doi:10.1037/pspi0000474

Abstract

= 909). Results indicated that lower conflict of interests was associated with higher cooperation and that (a) the implementation of sanctions (i.e., reward and punishment of behaviors) and (b) allowing for communication most strongly enhanced cooperation. However, we found inconsistent support for the hypotheses that group size and matching design affect cooperation. Other structural features (e.g., symmetry of dilemmas, sequential decision making, payment) were not associated with cooperation. Overall, these findings inform institutions that can (or not) facilitate cooperation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

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Discussions

• 🚨Excited that our meta-analysis is out in JPSP @APA_Journals. We synthesized 6 decades (1958-2017) of empirical evidence on social dilemmas and tested which structural features (most strongly) promot [bsky, 37 points, 3 comments]

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