2019/05/13 by Siddharth Barman, Barman, Siddharth, Federico Echenique +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic theories and models #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1905.05165
openalex publication_date 2019/05/13 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.