Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing

1987/02/01 by Stephen D. Williamson
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Banking stability, regulation, efficiency #Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism #Economic Theory and Policy

paper · doi:10.2307/1884684

Abstract

Journal Article Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing Get access Stephen D. Williamson Stephen D. Williamson Queen's University and University of Western Ontario Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 102, Issue 1, February 1987, Pages 135–145, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884684 Published: 01 February 1987

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