Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information

1976/11/01 by Michael Rothschild, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Joseph Stiglitz · 14 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Economic theories and models #Economic Theory and Institutions #Banking stability, regulation, efficiency

paper · doi:10.2307/1885326

Abstract

Introduction, 629.—I. The basic model, 630.—II. Robustness, 638—III. Conclusion, 648.

Citations

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