2020/09/17 by Víctor Mayoral-Vilches, Martin Pinzger, Mayoral-Vilches, Víctor +7 · 1 citation
Computer Science · #Advanced Malware Detection Techniques #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security #Robotics (cs.RO)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2009.08211
openalex publication_date 2020/09/17 · openalex created_date 2022/07/25 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
With its growing use in industry, ROS is rapidly becoming a standard in robotics. While developments in ROS 2 show promise, the slow adoption cycles in industry will push widespread ROS 2 industrial adoption years from now. ROS will prevail in the meantime which raises the question: can ROS be used securely for industrial use cases even though its origins didn't consider it? The present study analyzes this question experimentally by performing a targeted offensive security exercise in a synthetic industrial use case involving ROS-Industrial and ROS packages. Our exercise results in four groups of attacks which manage to compromise the ROS computational graph, and all except one take control of most robotic endpoints at desire. To the best of our knowledge and given our setup, results do not favour the secure use of ROS in industry today, however, we managed to confirm that the security of certain robotic endpoints hold and remain optimistic about securing ROS industrial deployments.