2025/06/19 by Zhu, Lei, Yan, Zhihao, Duan, Hongbo +2 · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Environmental Science · Social Sciences · #Ecosystem dynamics and resilience #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #General Economics (econ.GN)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2506.16162
openalex publication_date 2025/06/19 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Global cooperation is posited as a pivotal solution to address climate change, yet significant barriers, like free-riding, hinder its realization. This paper develops a dynamic game-theoretic model to analyze the stability of coalitions under multiple stochastic climate tippings, and a technology-sharing mechanism is designed in the model to combat free-ridings. Our results reveal that coalitions tend to shrink over time as temperatures rise, owing to potential free-ridings, despite a large size of initial coalition. The threat of climate tipping reduces the size of stable coalitions compared to the case where tipping is ignored. However, at post-tipping period, coalitions temporarily expand as regions respond to the shock, though this cooperation is short-lived and followed by further shrink. Notably, technology-sharing generates greater collective benefits than sanctions, suggesting that the proposed dynamic technology-sharing pathway bolsters coalition resilience against free-riding while limiting the global warming. This framework highlights the critical role of technology-sharing in fostering long-term climate cooperation under climate tipping uncertainties.