A Morality Evolutionary Game Theory Can Model

2026/02/24 by Mikhail Volkov
Neuroscience · Social Sciences · Psychology · #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/psa.2026.10202

Abstract

Abstract Evolutionary game-theoretic (EGT) models of morality face powerful under-addressed objections. Critics claim the simulations fail to specify their explanandum, muddying their explanatory value. Additionally, morality is suggested to be not computationally representable, jeopardising the method’s general applicability. This paper explicates and addresses the objections. I argue at least one concrete explication of morality, emotionism coupled with functionally understood emotions, can be a plausible subject of EGT explanations. I demonstrate how fixing this explanandum assuages the methodological objections and provide a computational model as proof of concept. If successful, the contribution placates serious long-standing criticisms of evolutionary game theory as a meta-ethical tool.

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