On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies

2005/12/01 by Juha T. Saatsi, Juha Saatsi · 2 citations
Arts and Humanities · Chemistry · Physics and Astronomy · #Argument (complex analysis) #Chemistry #Dignity #Economics #Epistemology #Falsity #Law #Pessimism #Philosophy #Philosophy and History of Science #Political science #Positive economics #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Realism #Scientific realism

paper · pdf · doi:10.1086/508959

published in Philosophy of Science 72(5), 1088-1098 (Cambridge University Press)

openalex publication_date 2005/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/07

Abstract

The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the realist program of responding to PMI by undermining one or another of its premises.

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