Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment

1985/09/01 by Isaac Levi · 2 citations
Decision Sciences · Computer Science · Arts and Humanities · #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference #Philosophy and History of Science

paper · doi:10.1086/289257

Abstract

Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey.

Citations

• On Indeterminate Probabilities
• Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued Mapping

Cited by

• Tracking probabilistic truths: a logic for statistical learning
• Independence Concepts for Convex Sets of Probabilities

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