In Defense of Reflection

2013/06/28 by Simon M. Huttegger · 24 citations
Arts and Humanities · Computer Science · Psychology · #Argument (complex analysis) #Calculus (dental) #Class (philosophy) #Computer science #Epistemology #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Feature (linguistics) #Foundation (evidence) #Generalization #History #Law #Linguistics #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Natural (archaeology) #Philosophy #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Political science #Programming language #Reading (process) #Reflection (computer programming)

paper · doi:10.1086/671427

published in Philosophy of Science 80(3), 413-433 (Cambridge University Press)

openalex publication_date 2013/06/28 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25

Abstract

I discuss two ways of justifying reflection principles. First, I propose that an undogmatic reading of dynamic Dutch book arguments provides them with a sound foundation. Second, I show also that minimizing expected inaccuracy leads to a novel argument for reflection principles. The required inaccuracy measures comprise a natural class of functions that can be derived from a generalization of a condition known as propriety or immodesty. This shows that reflection principles are an essential feature not just of consistent degrees of belief but also of degrees of belief that approximate truth.

Citations

• Belief and the Will
• Two principles of Bayesian epistemology
• Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility
• Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs
• Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection

Cited by

• Attention and Evidence
• Learning the Value of Value Learning

Related

• Distorted Reflection
• Intrinsic justifications for large-cardinal axioms
• Reflection principles, propositional proof systems, and theories
• Reflection principles, GCH and the uniformization properties
• The Principle of Redundant Reflection