2015/12/10 by Seamus Bradley, Katie Steele · 47 citations
Arts and Humanities · Mathematics · Psychology · #Artificial intelligence #Computer science #Computer security #Economics #Epistemology #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Irrational number #Key (lock) #Mathematics #Philosophy #Philosophy and History of Science #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Positive economics #Privilege (computing) #Resolution (logic) #Value (mathematics)
paper · pdf · doi:10.1086/684184
published in Philosophy of Science 83(1), 1-28 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 2015/12/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
This article considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: ( a ) it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid ‘free’ evidence, and ( b ) rational agents may have imprecise beliefs. An important aspect of responding to this conflict is resolving the question of how rational (imprecise) agents ought to make sequences of decisions—we make explicit what the key alternatives are and defend our own approach. We endorse a resolution of the aforementioned puzzle—we privilege decision theories that merely permit avoiding free evidence over decision theories that make avoiding free information obligatory.