2011/01/11 by Simon Prosser, SIMON PROSSER · 96 citations
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #B-theory of time #Cognitive psychology #Cognitive science #Computer science #Element (criminal law) #Epistemology #Illusion #Key (lock) #Law #Phenomenology (philosophy) #Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy #Philosophy #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Philosophy, Science, and History #Political science #Psychology #Representation (politics) #Virtue
paper · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00445.x
published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85(1), 92-116 (Wiley)
openalex publication_date 2011/01/11 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
According to the B‐theory, the passage of time is an illusion. The B‐theory therefore requires an explanation of this illusion before it can be regarded as fully satisfactory; yet very few B‐theorists have taken up the challenge of trying to provide one. In this paper I take some first steps toward such an explanation by first making a methodological proposal, then a hypothesis about a key element in the phenomenology of temporal passage. The methodological proposal focuses on the representational content of the element of experience by virtue of which time seems to pass. The hypothesis involves the claim that the experience of change involves the representation of something enduring, rather than perduring, through any change.