The Phenomenology of Cognition OrWhat Is It Like to Think That P?

2004/07/01 by David Pitt, DAVID PITT · 495 citations
Arts and Humanities · Mathematics · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Argument (complex analysis) #Cognition #Content (measure theory) #Embodied and Extended Cognition #Epistemology #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Mathematics #Metaphysics #Phenomenology (philosophy) #Philosophy #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Philosophy of mind #Philosophy of science #Psychology

paper · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00382.x

published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(1), 1-36 (Wiley)

openalex publication_date 2004/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30

Abstract

A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there's something it's like consciously to think that p , which is distinct from what it's like consciously to think that q . This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it. The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren't something it's like to think them. This argument is defended against several objections. The second argument uses what I call “minimal pair” experiences—sentences read without and with understanding—to induce in the reader an experience of the kind I claim exists. Further objections are considered and rebutted.

Citations

• Individualism and Self-knowledge

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