1997/06/01 by Bernard Reginster · 3 citations
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · #Accounting #Economics #Education, Literature, Philosophy Research #Epistemology #Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Philosophy #Valuation (finance)
paper · doi:10.2307/2953719
openalex publication_date 1997/06/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/23
The paper examines Nietzsche's claim that valuations born out of a psychological condition he calls are objectionable. It argues for a philosophically sound construal of this type of criticism, according to which the criticism is directed at the agent who holds values out of ressentiment, rather than at those values themselves. After presenting an analysis of ressentiment, the paper examines its impact on valuation and concludes with an inquiry into Nietzsche's reasons for claiming that ressentiment valuation is corrupt. Specifically, the paper proposes that ressentiment valuation involves a form of self-deception, that such self-deception is objectionable because it undermines the integrity of the self, and that the lack of such integrity ensnares the agent in a peculiar kind of practical inconsistency. The paper ends with a brief review of the problems and prospects of this interpretation.