2019/07/22 by Michael Hannon · 6 citations
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Political Philosophy and Ethics #Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
paper · doi:10.1111/phpr.12624
Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberative democracy. I then propose a version of deliberative democracy that is grounded in non‐veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because it facilitates empathetic understanding . I claim that empathetic understanding is an epistemic good that doesn't have truth as its primary goal.