The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics
1944/03/01 by Alfred Tarski · 1,624 citations
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Classical Philosophy and Thought #Cognitive science #Computer science #Epistemology #Linguistics #Philosophy #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Programming language #Psychology #Semantic theory of truth #Semantics (computer science)
paper · doi:10.2307/2102968
published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4(3), 341 (Wiley)
openalex publication_date 1944/03/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Abstract
X is true if, and only if, p. [...] we shall call a definition of truth “adequate” if all these equivalences follow from it. [...] The definition of truth which was outlined above [...] implies all equivalences of the form (T). In this connnection it is important to notice that the conditions for the material adequacy of the definition determine uniquely the extension of the term “true.” Therefore, every definition of truth which is materially adequate would necessarily be equivalent to that actually constructed. The semantic conception of truth gives us, so to speak, no possibility of choice between variaous non-equivalent definitions of this notion..
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