2010/05/01 by ALLAN HAZLETT, Allan Hazlett · 2 citations
Arts and Humanities · #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
paper · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00338.x
At least since the days of ‘ordinary language philosophy’, epistemologists (some more than others) have been interested in knowledge attributions—the meaning or meanings of ‘knows’, the use or uses of sentences of the form ‘S knows p’, and so on. And there has more recently been renewed interest in how ‘knows’ is used.1 Theorizing about knowledge on the basis of how ‘knows’ is used is, at least in principle, quite different from the epistemological tradition exemplified by the ‘post-Gettier’ literature on the analysis of knowledge. In this tradition, necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge are proposed, and tested against potential counterexamples. Imaginary situations are described, and intuitions (which are presumed correct) are elicited concerning whether or not a character in the story knows a certain proposition.2 Contrast this with the linguistic method: imaginary situations are described, and intuitions (which are presumed correct) are elicited concerning whether or not a character in the story said something acceptable.3 On the basis of this, a theory of the meaning of ‘knows’ is developed. But note that the result of this linguistic method might be a conclusion of the same kind as the result of the post-Gettier method, for one theory of the meaning of a word is simply a definition of it, in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions for its correct (i.e. true) application. So we can, at least in principle, distinguish between two competing methods of theorizing in epistemology—one based on intuitions about knowledge, and the other based on intuitions about language.4 Alternatively, a range of ‘value based’ methods have been suggested. Edward Craig proposes a genealogical approach, on which an inquiry into the sources of the concept of knowledge is the starting point for epistemology.5 Jonathan Kvanvig argues that no theory of knowledge can ignore the question of the value of knowledge.6 And Sally Haslanger has suggested an “ameliorative” approach to conceptual analysis, which can be applied to the concept of knowledge, on which the theorist identifies “what legitimate purposes we might have (if any) in categorizing [e.g. beliefs in terms of knowledge] and to develop concepts that would help us achieve these ends.”7,8, 7,8 Nothing speaks against using these various methods in tandem. Kvanvig, for example, favors a combination of the ‘post-Gettier’ method with a ‘value based’ method, where “the presumption in favor of the value of knowledge is strong enough that it gives reason to abandon even a counterexample-free account of the nature of knowledge if that account leaves no way open for defending the value of knowledge.”9 But the existence of a plurality of approaches to the question ‘What is knowledge?’ should give us pause—have we any reason to think that there is such a thing as the analysis of knowledge? What would make it the analysis of knowledge, as opposed to some competing definition? Do we really expect that a single definition of knowledge might be (even relatively) counterexample free, (even relatively) suitable as the ordinary meaning of ‘knows’, and (even relatively) successful vis-à-vis the ‘value based’ criteria proposed by Craig, Kvanvig, and Haslanger? At this stage one begins to wonder what the point of giving a definition of knowledge would be. In any case, it is within this context that I propose to criticize the following thesis: (Factivity) Certain two-place predicates, including ‘knows’, ‘learns’, ‘remembers’, and ‘realizes’, which denote relations between persons and propositions, are factive in this sense: an utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if p, an utterance of ‘S learned p’ is true only if p, and so on. Standard analyses of knowledge include a truth condition (S knows only if is true) and this of the analysis is by to linguistic in of epistemologists have to for for the truth But more if epistemologists have reason to at linguistic least if to on the analysis of knowledge. concept of knowledge that epistemologists have been interested in since the is a factive concept the that can be if the concept of knowledge that as the meaning of ‘knows’ in ordinary is strong that be interested in the concept of knowledge that as the meaning of ‘knows’ in ordinary same be said about the of to which the of a the whether or not it is a of this is by of ordinary so the for epistemological by to ordinary the is interested in an concept of knowledge, if is interested in a concept of knowledge at What is that epistemologists have to that knowledge is the to for this (which be to is to give the linguistic method in other a for the linguistic theory of knowledge and factive a and I something by a something true) with a (which is something and it is a of to the true of this linguistic that the is in In I some if are to In I and criticize two for and one for the that can be of these the of In I on ‘knows’ in and the that a concept of knowledge is the to as the meaning of ‘knows’ in ordinary for a theory of knowledge are In I theory of knowledge be a of that one ‘S knows p’ that is which of the of and for its as a a theory of knowledge and an to theory and the utterance of the following sentences not ordinary as that two in the that are by enough to the to in to But the with a it knows is In we learned that I a to the for it really a to make the for the I in and a and I in the of any that I I to of is, I these uses of ‘knows’, ‘learns’, ‘remembers’, and are and not ordinary as I that we some theory of these on which are I that the is that of these sentences be we have a to the should be by of competing of ‘knows’, ‘learns’, ‘remembers’, and ‘knows’, where that the theory of knowledge that and be But some to this can be with uses of factive to are of On some of are not not as as example, argues that an ordinary utterance of are two in the be true it is even there are no this is the of the to the to of is an utterance of it is, utterance is to be it the uses of ‘knows’, ‘learns’, ‘remembers’, and in the are is not as for example, that I to not or a to make the for to the truth condition on knowledge is the result of the of as with that it that the to at least one it to it not only that the it true that the by this has no with the that ‘knows’ is to that one that can be is in a to some and as we from and that as there is knowledge, there is knowledge, knowledge this the knowledge that the is and so we that there are a of as a of knowledge as the can be it from this that there are a plurality of this is an that the of on the other can be about knowledge gives us no to about uses of factive to are in which said are used with a different than are and other factive are in some a factive in a I the of to be a for a linguistic So should not be we should a theory on which ‘knows’ is such in to the question of whether ‘knows’ is in for of is the that are are of into the of the or I of this for can distinguish two on the one is a about the truth conditions of certain that knowledge is factive (i.e. that can be on the other is a about the necessary conditions on I proposed a for the theory of knowledge and terms of this would us to that knowledge is at the same that is that knowledge, as that which ‘knows’ In this I two are for as the is based on and the is based on the of in an utterance of p, is an for the that can be In these I the of these are at has is has for and it as is something that the of But it should not be this not the that can be to be the that it is not a against the some of this to But as as the the of can is that have an about At is to to and not that that ‘knows’ and its are said by that the of the that truth is necessary for knowledge is the there is between knowledge and true the that of the concept of knowledge this way is that knowledge is to be as true something thing to is that it not from the that knowledge is more than true by that truth is necessary for knowledge, that truth is a of knowledge. is more than it from this that is a of is the that the in the is not from an ordinary language point of is between knowledge and And there to be two of in which knowledge is and in which the truth of some is that the for example, the has been and that it has and in which the truth of some is in it that this is the the whether this is the is to using ‘knows’ the way that in the to knowledge to a true I is of the context of the that knowledge is true something is in the context of where about the of correct) beliefs In any case, us the from factive are of a of with certain in which the factive factive can be by that I the that I the I the that I the factive are to be by are I the I the factive by with be by I to have the I to have the this it is that the of factive are in the at the this a of has certain in is not a reason to that have any in it is a reason to that have some in So even if the on are to one this not a reason to that are on have we to be in from to these the on not I the that I the I learned the that I the I the that I the I the I learned the I the I to have the I to have the In other as and ‘knows’ and are that are factive in of But since we are for to that these are this is in with that gives us no reason to that ‘knows’ and are from p, ‘knows’ is for the other factive p, is not an utterance of it is to that is to that p, and p, is is to a the utterance of which would be for a utterance of p, is the is not a as p, is not is p, as in the of the be that knows p, to be a In I some concerning the of use of and there I that one ‘S knows p’ that is ‘S knows p, can But the that sentences of this form are should the that that p, and learned p, from knows only if that be is one that be So knowledge knows only if that is is I it for the and as it as of of is not of even it has if is the truth condition from the of the truth condition can be by the of that might from it as the of the truth that some might be to and from the truth condition to At we can that the that knowledge truth is with the that knowledge be be of any of for one the I only that the that knowledge truth be (even it is a of the of we a concept of knowledge that would be the to as the meaning of ‘knows’ in ordinary in other the suitable concept to use in giving a and for ordinary knowledge What of concept would we In this I that a concept is to its it to giving a and for ordinary knowledge method that used in be described, and a on the basis of and be knowledge with is for the of a it is at least one ‘S knows p’ that is In I the that this is by an from ‘S knows p’ to the truth of So I the some other that ‘knows’ is and that a can be for are in terms of in terms of the conditions to be necessary for the truth of knowledge But an of the of these be an of the of to give to account for to a theory that a concept of knowledge it the which that an utterance of ‘S knows p’ might be true even is the following are necessary conditions on the truth of knowledge utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if for is in a on which there is a conceptual between and is a conceptual truth that beliefs to be the theory proposed is with the that knowledge some to the said to be by the truth that in a I to an concept of in that what we is a concept of knowledge that is and suitable as the meaning of ‘knows’ in ordinary On the there are a plurality of sufficient conditions for including two that a that is if that in a that is if that is of these of is sufficient for And it is open that there be other sufficient conditions for so as not the that it is a conceptual truth that beliefs to be In any case, this concept of knowledge, the truth of that is not for that to as knowledge. theory proposed is on the question of whether the conditions in and are sufficient for the truth of ‘S knows p’, or on whether there are necessary conditions on the truth of ‘S knows p’ the of the condition that is theory is it to the question of whether the concept of knowledge is in terms of necessary and sufficient or whether it is in a theory to a concept of knowledge this the which these utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if is utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only that is it not be in what about the of the condition of and the various it might a theory based on a concept of knowledge, which the I have in a of that knowledge is a of about would not with a true about the that is enough to the So the theory that an utterance of ‘S knows p’ might be true even p, the following are necessary conditions on the truth of knowledge utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if is utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if is a of about p, in of there an which the and with vis-à-vis of these is to ordinary uses of I to that this is it to that a theory of knowledge should be to the following about the use of use ‘knows’ to and are a for from the about how the the use ‘knows’ to the beliefs of a the truth of the in and are for is whether the a that what a use ‘knows’ to the truth of some and are a for we be that this one is of the I that this is a of use ‘knows’ to that are as in and use ‘knows’ to of and are the at the for it only to has a which knows use ‘knows’ to the of is to the of a that is in the for I I to on the that these of quite different uses of ‘knows’, in the that the of knowledge has a quite different in the different of theory of knowledge should give a for ‘knows’ that how this is an utterance of ‘S knows p’ can be true is and and are it are of where that the is What this I that the to this question is not the same in this of the of uses that we have for ‘knows’, and I not of the of have the of on one or way of using But the I are more or in I the that it is by the to a of which and to at least that of not to be or which have reason to is that of to a as and only as as is and that of to a the of and of an a a concept of knowledge, note that the of of knowledge, in the for have been by using an In the for and we with said the quite that what a and this is a of At these sentences the with suitable in the if said the by are about what of I that we the sentences with these other what I is that we and something that would not would be what that the that the a and that the is a of so I to to the are not to be by that ‘S knows p’ that is But whether this is on the of of these of it is that are to and that that the and that to this as would of the that think that the that are or something to that knowledge is to something that that the for that the that is that only what is that the not the that it is, should not that that is that would to that is to that that that that the is this to of by the of to and that a the that the is open to the a the not that the is open to the I in of one ‘S knows p’ that is ‘S knows p’ not that is of about whether the a to that the that what a would have to of it would be for one to something that that has for p, a that use and a to knowledge can that that the a is of it would be to that in this it is that the a other the form of this to of a with to a the to is that is to and that But the to not that is to that the same I the ‘S knows p’ in of that is ‘S knows p’ not that is are that we as of for example, of the is for to as about with even if the or even a that theory these to be of that is of to that what is by knowledge in this is the same as what is in the of whether the the beliefs of the are described, with truth of I a of that knowledge are used to make a or that something is the case, where such can be by with to that that p, or to p, and is with something that or I think p’ or I it is open to in the for to to not whether the is a of I think it is the that not in this way that to a to that one knows that one that p, in the form of an utterance of p’, is to a to in the form of a utterance of to In the is what is And the that be to that p, and that be to to as an utterance of to for a to even to not that I an utterance of p’ of for a that p, even p’ not that is that if to be not really an with if to not really But this is are a of to the even if I to some I to if it that I to utterance have true (i.e. I really to I the same about p’, of the of the of are would to that of are the uses of ‘knows’ we this account for the that ‘S knows p’ that is on the of it, of and are So the theory with these to the I that of not and the that the the no one is be as one in which the is no more no than in the that the knows is So there is no to that from this of between knowledge and is that the same can be said for that the of in that the to the other not the of what is on in of I to that the in might by that an is the the of to the the or of the is knowledge, or are of that I think are of or for example, if I that it is that some I might with I the or so it to I I might as have I if this to the I is to whether make of this which case, to how the is an or which case, to how is some kind of I which of these is the that any theory a concept of knowledge can of I and I have the by to an account of an account which is at with of is open to the of a factive concept of knowledge, to the of I have the theory is it to of and be the of of uses of is suggested by concerning a with to be and that would the I that these sentences by us into the point of of the us the In the point of into which we are a the using that the might use that So we use in that not the of account not about the of the But there are between this case, and the of and the a with to be to the question of whether the really with not how the ordinary or would to such a question of whether really uses of the other the of in this And for would to the question of whether the the question as opposed to is to is to account that the be the that utterance is is to distinguish of an an account of from an of of the word use the a with to be that no are of that a with is But it is not least not as as in the of the that use sentences and that can be or that that is these are not to even can use and and is with the that can be is not to that can be can be about such But if this is not to it be that of be and to be that can be a between the two are a by so we have reason to that no are of on the basis of this knowledge that we that a with to be be is not a and even if it is, I think we have on which to that can be of the concept of in some not to for But the of the concept of knowledge are not more reason to the to the theory a theory of is that us to in ordinary the are as the theory on an that the theory the of in an account of with the this is enough to the in favor of the What about the theory that it can of and as not on in of for this it to with of and for in this we use ‘knows’ to to a this is one of the uses we have for knowledge the is not that utterance in for example, to be on this the a of is that has that the that a the of ‘S knows p’ that p, the as any theory a concept of knowledge one ‘S knows p’ that is any theory a concept of knowledge one ‘S knows p’ that I to a conceptual between and to account for the But there is as I can such conceptual between knowledge, as of by the and In any case, the least that can be said is to an account of the that one ‘S knows p’ that is theory us an account of one ‘S knows p’ that with the the theory some as theory of with of might be that this is by the that the theory no account of as it would be to in such as as knowledge, so the theory no these the theory is the to in and can the from knowledge to the truth of the But it is to a this that ‘knows’ is I have a that this is it be to what would be by knowledge one and knowledge true and knowledge a the of uses of ‘knows’, one of these this is I think any way to against But note would the analysis of knowledge. of for ‘knows’ for what we on that is not one definition of knowledge ‘knows’ has a plurality of from the linguistic point of about the definition that it the other than epistemological the point of of epistemological tradition, of that definition But one is that if the truth condition is to linguistic uses of ‘knows’ on the that ‘knows’ is not this the for the truth In this that a concept of knowledge is the to as the meaning of ‘knows’ in ordinary I no between the the of this is not to about the for ‘learns’, ‘remembers’, and of these other might quite different from the for And the of the various uses of ‘knows’ with the theory to is not to be a I think a an and theory of ordinary use of of has been to to abandon the that the form a or there is some or of that the or the that not such a I have a for that an utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if is that ‘knows’ is are other that are including other two-place a to a into two-place a to a and What I have said so is with some or of these in some I not if or of these to be the of I not that one can by of the used against the that others) are against the that an utterance of ‘S is true only if What proposed is with the that ‘S knows whether ‘S knows ‘S knows what ‘S knows where and so are ‘S us that with ‘S us whether which are to be the of has suggested the of it should this no more than the of should the of the of at that of that of this that ‘knows’ or is that ‘S knows whether p’ has different than ‘S knows is no and no to the of for a account of the that one ‘S knows p’ that is and against with the is a account of the the is by to about ‘knows’ in this case, a necessary condition on the truth of ‘S knows is an that is the that the use of an utterance of ‘S knows the truth of is the in terms of might be by to the meaning of or by to the of is that it is something about ‘knows’, in that the from an utterance of ‘S knows p’ to the truth of that a account of in terms of not that it not the truth condition on knowledge. is as is one utterance p, an utterance of as is in the of ‘S knows utterance of ‘S knows p’ the truth of p, in the same and to the same as an utterance of ‘S p’ the truth of example, as utterance of that what a that what the a so would an utterance of that what a I what to about of these sentences what the a terms of truth that no one to that the truth of is a necessary condition on not that p, on the that an utterance of ‘S that p’ is true only if is on the that an utterance of ‘S p’ that is But no one should to that the truth of is a necessary condition on that p, on the that an utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if is on the that an utterance of ‘S knows p’ that is to that the account proposed in is to the that an utterance of ‘S knows p’ of ‘S the truth of reason a account is if its are is that its only to about language and how we use we the on if we can linguistic terms of about as a In this the account is than the of I have that a concept of knowledge is to it to giving a theory of ordinary knowledge that to ordinary language for for the truth condition on knowledge. this, and ordinary language we might the theory of knowledge would be by should not be if we a plurality of concepts of suitable to the purposes and of the theorist proposes we should we there such a thing as the concept of knowledge in the in that I even how to