2003/06/10 by Anthony Ellis · 60 citations
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · Psychology · Social Sciences · #Criminal law #Criminology #Deterrence (psychology) #Deterrence theory #Economics #Epistemology #Free Will and Agency #Law #Law and economics #Philosophy #Political Philosophy and Ethics #Political science #Presupposition #Psychology #Punishment (psychology) #Social psychology #Sociology of punishment #War, Ethics, and Justification
paper · doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00316
published in The Philosophical Quarterly 53(212), 337-351 (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 2003/06/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/02
I start from the presupposition that the use of force against another is justified only in self‐defence or in defence of others against aggression. If so, the main work of justifying punishment must rely on its deterrent effect, since most punishments have no other significant self‐defensive effect. It has often been objected to the deterrent justification of punishment that it commits us to using offenders unacceptably, and that it is unable to deliver acceptable limits on punishment. I describe a sort of deterrent theory which can avoid both of these objections.