2005/11/29 by Benjamin Schnieder · 21 citations
Arts and Humanities · Mathematics · Psychology · #Argument (complex analysis) #Classical Philosophy and Thought #Epistemology #Fallacy #Historical Philosophy and Science #Inference #Mathematics #Philosophy #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Variety (cybernetics)
paper · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00427.x
published in The Philosophical Quarterly 56(222), 39-54 (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 2005/11/29 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/27
I investigate a form of argument which refers to Leibniz's law as its inference ticket (where ‘Leibniz's law’ is understood as the thesis that if x = y, then all properties of x are properties of y, and vice versa). Arguments of this form are often used to establish certain categorial distinctions, e.g., a distinction between kinds and properties, or a distinction between processes and events. I show that there can be deficient arguments of this form, and why. I then argue that the interesting philosophical cases of this argument form are unconvincing, since they cannot be seen as clear cases of its unproblematic variety.