2025/04/30 by Pietro Belotti, Austin Buchanan, Soraya Ezazipour · 2 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Game Theory and Voting Systems
paper · doi:10.1287/opre.2024.1078
When drawing political districts, important criteria include district compactness and the ability of minority groups to convert votes into seats. In litigation, compactness is usually measured via the Polsby-Popper score; however, this score has largely been absent from the operations research literature, presumably because of its nonlinear nature. In “Political Districting to Optimize the Polsby-Popper Compactness Score with Application to Voting Rights,” Belotti, Buchanan, and Ezazipour propose new mixed-integer second-order cone programs (MISOCPs) to optimize this score, enabling them to find optimally compact districts built from voting precincts. The methods are extended to find compact plans with many majority-minority districts. This is the task faced by plaintiffs in lawsuits brought under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 who must show that an alternative plan exists in which the minority group could achieve better representation. Computational experiments show that the MISCOP-based methods perform as well (or better) than state-of-the-art approaches for this task, scaling to instances with nearly 200,000 census blocks.