2011/02/01 by Dimitris Bertsimas, Vivek F. Farias, Nikolaos Trichakis · 16 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Decision Sciences · #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Auction Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Applications
paper · doi:10.1287/opre.1100.0865
In this paper we study resource allocation problems that involve multiple self-interested parties or players and a central decision maker. We introduce and study the price of fairness, which is the relative system efficiency loss under a “fair” allocation assuming that a fully efficient allocation is one that maximizes the sum of player utilities. We focus on two well-accepted, axiomatically justified notions of fairness, viz., proportional fairness and max-min fairness. For these notions we provide a tight characterization of the price of fairness for a broad family of problems.