2025/05/02 by Daniel Halpern, Halpern, Daniel, Ariel D. Procaccia +3
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #European and International Contract Law #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems #Law, logistics, and international trade #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.01395
openalex publication_date 2025/05/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winner voting. We introduce a version of this principle for approval ballots, which we call flexible-voter representation (FVR). We show that while the approval voting rule and other natural scoring rules provide the optimal FVR guarantee only for some flexibility threshold, there exists a scoring rule that is FVR-optimal for all thresholds simultaneously. We also extend our results to multi-winner voting.