2024/11/04 by Wolfgang Kuhle, Kuhle, Wolfgang
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Blockchain Technology Applications and Security #Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis #FOS: Economics and business #General Economics (econ.GN)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2411.01938
openalex publication_date 2024/11/04 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The present paper shows that it can be advantageous for traders to publish their information on the true value of an asset even if they (i) cannot build a position in the asset prior to the publication of their information and (ii) cannot charge for the provision of information. The model also shows that the informational content of prices is U-shaped in the number of traders who publish their information. Put differently, information aggregation works best if either no trader, or if every trader publishes his information. Small groups of distinguished experts are, on the contrary, an obstacle to information aggregation. The model's key assumption is that the perception/interpretation of a given piece of published information differs slightly across traders.