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The Self‐Evidencing Brain

2014/03/24 by Jakob Hohwy · 556 citations
Mathematics · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Action Observation and Synchronization #Boundary (topology) #Cognition #Cognitive psychology #Cognitive science #Computer science #Embodied and Extended Cognition #Embodied cognition #Epistemology #Mathematics #Neural dynamics and brain function #Neuroscience #Philosophy #Psychology #Relation (database) #Set (abstract data type) #Skepticism

paper · doi:10.1111/nous.12062

published in Noûs 50(2), 259-285 (Wiley)

openalex publication_date 2014/03/24 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29

Abstract

Abstract An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization (PEM). This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self‐evidencing . This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain and its environment. This boundary defines the mind‐world relation, opens the door to skepticism, and makes the mind transpire as more inferentially secluded and neurocentrically skull‐bound than many would nowadays think. Therefore, PEM somewhat deflates contemporary hypotheses that cognition is extended, embodied and enactive; however, it can nevertheless accommodate the kinds of cases that fuel these hypotheses.

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