1989/06/01 by Paul Draper · 274 citations
Arts and Humanities · Chemistry · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Chemistry #Epistemology #Karl Barth and Christian Theology #Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations #Neuroscience #Pain and pleasure #Philosophy #Pleasure #Psychology #Theism #Theology and Philosophy of Evil
paper · doi:10.2307/2215486
published in Noûs 23(3), 331 (Wiley)
openalex publication_date 1989/06/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
I will argue in this paper that our knowledge about pain and pleasure creates an epistemic problem for theists. The problem is not that some proposition about pain and pleasure can be shown to be both true and logically inconsistent with theism. Rather, the problem is evidential. A statement reporting the observations and testimony upon which our knowledge about pain and pleasure is based bears a certain significant negative evidential relation to theism.' And because of this, we have a prima facie good epistemic reason to reject theism-that is, a reason that is sufficient for rejecting theism unless overridden by other reasons for not rejecting theism.