2009/04/01 by Otávio Bueno, Scott A. Shalkowski · 2 citations
Psychology · Arts and Humanities · Computer Science · #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Philosophy, Science, and History #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
paper · doi:10.1093/mind/fzp033
Logical pluralism is the view according to which there is more than one relation of logical consequence, even within a given language. A recent articulation of this view has been developed in terms of quantification over different cases: classical logic emerges from consistent and complete cases; constructive logic from consistent and incomplete cases, and paraconsistent logic from inconsistent and complete cases. We argue that this formulation causes pluralism to collapse into either logical nihilism or logical universalism. In its place, we propose a modalist account of logical pluralism that is independently well motivated and that avoids these collapses.