2024/08/01 by Barbara Vetter · 4 citations
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Agency (philosophy) #Artificial intelligence #Cognitive science #Computer science #Counterfactual thinking #Epistemology #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Modal #Modality (human–computer interaction) #Perception #Philosophy #Philosophy and History of Science #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Psychology #Social epistemology
paper · doi:10.1093/mind/fzae037
published in Mind 133(532), 1001-1027 (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 2024/08/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/06
Abstract Over the past two decades, modal epistemology has turned its attention to ordinary modal knowledge. This paper brings to the fore a neglected but central form of ordinary modal knowledge: knowledge of agentive modality, and in particular of our own abilities, which I call ‘ability knowledge’. I argue that modal epistemology as it is does not account for ability knowledge, by looking at the most promising candidate theories: perception-based, counterfactual-based, and similarity-based modal epistemologies. I then outline a more promising epistemology for our ability knowledge, which relies on the experience of our own agency, and draw out some lessons for modal epistemology in general.