2007/11/01 by Mark Textor · 1 citation
Psychology · Computer Science · Arts and Humanities · #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
paper · doi:10.1093/mind/fzm947
Does the English demonstrative pronoun ‘that ’ (including complex demonstratives of the form ‘that F’) have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding ‘No’. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called ‘hybrid proper name ’ (Künne) that contains the demonstra-tive pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why Frege held the hybrid proper name view, I will defend it against recent criticism, and argue that it is superior to views that take demonstrative pronouns to be the bearer of semantic properties. 1.