2023/02/01 by Itai Arieli, Arieli, Itai, Ronen Gradwohl +3
Decision Sciences · Physics and Astronomy · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2302.00281
openalex publication_date 2023/02/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if and only if this equilibrium either reveals no information to the receiver or fully reveals one of the states with positive probability. We then characterize the actions that can be played with positive probability in any robust equilibrium. Finally, we fully characterize the optimal sender-utility under binary receiver's private information, and provide bounds for the optimal sender-utility under general private information.